Labour supply, search and taxes by Manning, Alan
Abstract
Classical labour supply theory is one of the most sophisticated parts of labour economics.  Yet,
there is no compelling theoretical reason to believe in an outcome on a classical labour supply
curve and it is unclear whether it is a good empirical description of the way in which labour
markets actually work.  This paper uses the techniques of search theory to analyse the impact of
changes in the tax system on incentives to work when individuals do not have flexibility of hours
within jobs.  It is shown how the traditional comparative statics are of some use but are rarely the
whole story and some comparative statics results are surprising.  For example, it is shown how
a revenue-neutral increase in marginal tax rates will increase incentives to work.
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Labour Supply, Search and Taxes
Alan Manning
Introduction
Most work on labour supply (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1998, for a recent survey) starts from
what Pencavel, 1986, calls the canonical model in which individuals freely choose how many
hours of work they supply to the market at a constant hourly wage.  Yet, in many circumstances
individuals do not seem to have such flexibility over their hours of work (see Stewart and
Swaffield, 1997, for UK evidence on the extent to which individuals feel constrained in the hours
they can work) and the model seems inappropriate.  Supporters of the labour supply methodology
often then fall back on the argument that “even if each employer specified not merely the wage rate
but also the number of hours each employee is expected to work, provided the wage offer does not
vary systematically with the stipulated hours and provided the entire range of hours of work is
covered by the employers’ offers then a continuous linear budget constraint arises from the
aggregation over many employers’ wage-hours packages” (Pencavel, 1986, p.36).  If there were
strong theoretical reasons to believe that individuals should be on their classical labour supply
curves then one might be tempted to give these arguments serious weight.  But, there is no reason
to believe that individuals would be on a classical labour supply curve in a perfectly competitive
equilibrium so that there is little reason to privilege the canonical model in the way that is usually
done.  There is a danger that the traditional conclusions about the impact of taxes are not robust
to reasonable alternative assumptions about the flexibility of hours within jobs.
This paper relaxes the assumption that individuals can freely choose their hours within jobs
and goes to the opposite extreme in considering a labour market where there is no variation in
hours within jobs.  This assumption about the flexibility of hours within jobs is as arbitrary as the
assumption made in the canonical model so that one should think of this paper as an investigation
into the robustness of conventional results, an exercise that is important once one realizes there is
no reason to pay special attention to the canonical model. 
If individuals are simply offered a single income-hours package the only decision is
whether to take the job or not:  a paper on the impact of the tax system on this decision would be
neither long nor interesting.  This paper complicates the individual’s decision by using a search
model:  how the optimal search for jobs responds to taxes is an interesting question even if
individuals have little or no control over the hours they work within jobs.  This is not just an
exercise:  search theory has proved its value in many parts of labour economics e.g. it has been
widely used to analyse to analyse the impact of unemployment insurance on incentives to find and
take jobs (e.g. Mortensen, 1977).  But surprisingly little work has been done on the impact of the
tax system (honourable exceptions being Pissarides, 1983, and Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995a,b).
There is a curious dichotomy in which analysis of  unemployment insurance generally uses a search
framework while analysis of tax changes uses a labour supply framework; although both sets of
papers are about the impact of changing incentives to work.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we outline the argument for why the
canonical model of labour supply is not generally a feature of a competitive equilibrium.  We then
introduce the search model and analyse how changes in marginal and average tax rates might be
expected to affect labour supply on both the extensive and intensive margins.  Some of the results
of classical labour supply theory remain relevant but they are rarely the complete story and some
results are surprising given the conventional wisdom.  For example, it is shown that a revenue-
neutral increase in marginal tax rates will increase labour supply on the extensive margin.
2max A(N,h) & yN s.t. u(y,h) $ u0 (1)
AN(N,h) & y ' 0 (2)
Ah(N,h) % µuh(y,h) ' 0 (3)
&N % µuy(y,h) ' 0 (4)
y.uy(y,h) % h.uh(y,h) ' 0 (5)
yN & hAh(N,h) ' 0 (6)
NAN(N,h) & hAh(N,h) ' 0 (7)
2. The Canonical Model of Labour Supply and Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we briefly outline the argument that a classical labour supply curve is not generally
a feature of a competitive equilibrium, an argument that can be traced back to Lewis (1969).
Consider a firm with a production function A(N,h) where N is the level of employment and h is
the hours of work of each worker.  Suppose that all workers have a utility function u(y,h) where
y is income and h are hours of work.  Assuming that all workers are identical keeps matters simple
but nothing of importance depends on it.
In a competitive market there will be a going rate of utility, u0, which the firm has to offer
to attract any workers.  It is efficient for the firm to offer an income-hours package and to choose
a level of employment to maximize profits subject to offering workers the market level of utility
i.e. N,y and h will be chosen to solve the following problem:
The first-order conditions for the solution to this problem can be written as:
where µ is the multiplier on the constraint.  We are interested in the conditions under which the
equilibrium outcome is on a labour supply curve as conventionally defined i.e. where one can
decentralise the equilibrium by the firm simply offering a fixed hourly wage and allowing workers
a free choice in their hours of work.  In this case, the equilibrium outcome must satisfy the
following first-order condition:
Using (3) and (4) this can be written as:
and, then using (2), this can be written as:
This condition is only satisfied if the production function can be written as A(Nh).  In this case
the firm is happy to leave the choice of hours to the worker as the employer can always respond
1 A large part of research into labour supply has been concerned with relaxing this
assumption but we will not pursue this further here (see Blundell et al, 1998, for a search model
that does not make this assumption though does assume perfect flexibility of hours within jobs).
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by altering the number of workers leaving total hours worked and the total wage bill unchanged.
The intuition for this result is very simple.  Suppose that A(N,h)=Na(h) so that there are
constant returns in employment.  In a competitive equilibrium the income earned by working h
hours will be a(h).  Given a utility function u(y,h), individuals will choose hours h which
maximise u(a(h),h).  This can be represented graphically in Figure 1a where we have drawn a(h)
as initially a convex function of hours worked because of set-up costs but eventually concave as
exhaustion sets in (as in Card, 1990).  
As can be seen from Figure 1a, there is no reason for the line of tangency at the optimal
income-hours combination to go through the origin which would be required to decentralise the
competitive equilibrium by setting a constant hourly wage as is assumed in the canonical labour
supply model.  One can only guarantee this if a(h) is linear in h as represented in Figure 1b.  This
is simply a special case of the result described above as the production function can be written
as A(N,h)=aNh in this case.
 Where the equilibrium outcome is not on a traditional labour supply curve, there are a
number of ways in which the optimal contract could be implemented.  The employer could use a
more sophisticated labour contract and leave the worker to make the final decision on hours.  In
this case detailed knowledge of the employment contract would allow the researcher to work out
the marginal hourly wage faced by a worker and, hence, estimate the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure.   But, if the employer chose to attain the optimal outcome by
simply fixing the hours required of the worker, no amount of detailed knowledge of the labour
contract would enable one to estimate the marginal rate of substitution. In the classical case of
Figure 1b, there would seem to be some practical advantage in the employer setting a linear
contract as the optimal contract is independent of  the preferences of workers so the employer
does not need that information.  But, this argument is not valid if we move away from the classical
case as knowledge of preferences is needed to design the optimal employment contract.
As described in the introduction, this paper is based on the assumption that there is no
flexibility of hours within jobs.  This can be thought of as assuming that a(h) has the form
represented in Figure 1c so that the hours worked within jobs are not sensitive to the tax system.
One should think of this as being the opposite extreme to the assumption embodied in Figure 1b:
by looking at the extremes, one would hope to get some idea of how robust standard results are.
Ideally, one would like to work with the general case represented in Figure 1a (as that is probably
the most realistic case) but that is rather too complicated.  
3. A Simple Search Model
In this section we shall present a simple search model that we will use for our analysis of the
impact of the tax system on incentives to work.  To keep matters simple we will assume that the
individual is in a static environment with a utility function u(y,h) where y is income and h is hours
of work.  We will make the assumption (common in search theory) that all income is consumed
when earned.1
The existing papers that have tried to marry search and labour supply (e.g. Burdett and
Mortensen, 1978; Blundell at al, 1998) have made the assumption that jobs differ in the hourly
2Given this it might be best to think of the analysis that follows as giving the impact of a
‘scheme’ that affects only a small fraction of the population and hence does not have large general
equilibrium effects.
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drV
u ' u(b&tu,0) % ?ummax V(x)&V u,0 dF(x)
' u(b&tu,0) % ?um
r
V(x)&V u dF(x)
(8)
wages they offer but that hours can be freely chosen within jobs i.e.  they assume that individuals
find it difficult to find a good job in terms of the hourly wage but that, once they have found a job,
they have no difficulty in working their desired hours in that job.  For the reasons given in the
introduction we want to dispense with this assumption of perfect flexibility in hours within jobs.
Our approach will be to go to the opposite extreme and to assume that job offers are characterised
by an income-hours package with no flexibility in hours worked.  If workers want to find a job
with their desired level of hours, they need to look for it.  We will write the distribution function
of income conditional on hours as F(y*h) and the marginal distribution function of hours as J(h).
We will use lower case letters to denote density functions.  We also assume that the distribution
of earnings offers is unaffected by the tax system:  this is consistent with the assumption usually
made in the canonical labour supply model of the exogeneity of the pre-tax wage but it is important
to realise that most general equilibrium models (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Lockwood and
Manning, 1993; Pissarides, 1998) would suggest that there is likely to be some impact of the tax
system on the distribution of pre-tax earnings2.  It is an important task to get some idea of the
general equilibrium incidence of changes in the tax system but one which needs much more work
than is going to be provided in this paper. 
 As the purpose of this paper is to show how conventional results on the impact of the tax
system on work incentives do not necessarily carry over to a search model, we are not going to
analyse the general case.  In particular, we consider the following two extreme assumptions about
the job offer distribution:
         -       all variation in job offers is in the hourly wage at fixed hours
         -       all variation in job offers is in hours at a fixed hourly wage
Let us consider these two cases in turn.
4. Variation in Hourly Wages
In this section we adopt the simplifying assumption that all jobs offer the same hours so that the
variation in jobs is only in the hourly wage offered.  For notational simplicity, we will drop the
‘h’ argument from the distribution of job offers and simply write it as F(y).  Denote the value
function for an unemployed worker by Vu, and the value function for a worker employed at
earnings y by V(y).  Vu will be given by:
where b is the flow of income when unemployed, dr is the interest rate, ?u is the arrival rate of job
offers when unemployed, F(y) is the earnings offer distribution, t(y) is the net tax paid if employed
at income y and tu is the net tax paid if unemployed.  In deriving the second line, we have used the
fact that the reservation wage, r, must satisfy Vu=V(r).  For workers in employment we have:
5drV(y) ' u(y&t(y),h) & du[V(y)&V
u] % ?em
y
[V(x)&V(y)]dF(x) (9)
u(r&t(r),h) % (?e&?u)m
r
V(x)&V(r) dF(x) ' u(b&tu,0) (10)
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My
'
uy.[1&ty(y)]
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r
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.[1&F(x)]dx (12)
u(r&t(r),h) % (?e&?u).m
r
uy.[1&ty(x)][1&F(x)]
d%?e[1&F(x)]
dx ' u(b&tu,0) (13)
p '
?u[1&F(r)]
du%?u[1&F(r)]
(14)
where du is the rate of job loss and ?e is the arrival rate of job offers when employed. 
Evaluating (9) at y=r, and subtracting this from (8) leads to:
Now differentiating (9) leads to:
where d=du+dr.  Now integrate the term under the integral sign in (10) by parts to obtain:
Substituting (11) into (12) and then putting it back into (10) yields the following expression for
the reservation wage:
(13) is essentially the standard expression for the reservation wage, modified for the presence of
the tax system.  For example, the marginal tax rate appears in the integral term as this represents
the utility return from obtaining a job with a higher pre-tax wage.  One feature of (13) which will
be useful later is that the level of utility at the reservation wage is above (below) the level of
utility when unemployed as on-the-job search is less (more) effective than off-the-job search.  
The case analysed here can only be used to study the extensive margin of labour supply
(i.e. whether the individual is in work or not):  there is obviously no interest in the intensive
margin  as all job offers are assumed to have the same hours.  As “the strongest empirical effects
of wages and non-labour income on labour supply are to be found on the extensive margin”
(Heckman, 1993, p.118), this margin is probably the more interesting one empirically.  The
probability of being in work, p, is given by:
(14) implies that a study of how the reservation wage responds to changes in the tax system
contains (in our model) all the information required to determine how the employment rate will
respond.  In traditional labour supply analysis, it is conventional to decompose changes in the tax
system into changes in average and marginal tax rates holding the other part of the tax system
6d%?u(1&F(r))
d%?e(1&F(r))
. Mr
Mt
'
uy(r&t(r),h)&uy(b&tu,0) & (?u&?e).m
r
uyy.[1&ty(x)][1&F(x)]
d%?e[1&F(x)]
dx
(15)
sgn Mr
Mt
' sgn uy(r&t(r),h)&uy(b&tu,0) (16)
&uyyuh
uy
% uyh >(<) 0 (17)
constant: let us apply this methodology in the search framework.
4.1 Changes in average tax rates
First, consider a rise in the average tax rate holding the marginal tax rate constant.  Let us do this
in the purest way possible by assuming that an amount of income t  is deducted from each
individual whether they are employed or unemployed and whatever their income.  If we assume
that leisure is a normal good, the classical result is that a reduction in post-tax income can only
induce an individual who previously was not working to start working:  nobody who is already
working will become inactive.  As we shall see, this result does have some useful content in the
search model but it is not the whole story.  The following proposition gives us the general result:
Proposition 1:An increase in the average tax rate t  at all income levels has the following impact
on the reservation wage:
Proof: Simple differentiation of (13).
The sign of (Mr/Mt ) depends on the sign of the right-hand side of (15).  The general case is rather
hard to analyse as there are circumstances in which we can put an unambiguous sign on this and
others in which we cannot.  So, we will proceed by analysing some special cases to build up a
picture of the different effects at work.  First, let us start by assuming that on- and off-the-job
search are equally effective so that ?u =?e. 
Proposition 2a: If  ?u =?e then:
(i)
(ii) If:
and uy>0, uh<0 for all (y,h) then  (Mr/Mt )>(<)0.
Proof: See Appendix.
3 Although a non-convexity in the budget set (e.g. because of time and money costs of going
to work) requires, even in the classical case, attention to more than the local normality of leisure
and can produce comparative statics similar to those of the search model described here.  
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The final expression in (17) is familiar from classical labour supply theory as the sign of this
determines whether leisure is a normal good.  If it is then an increase in the average tax rate
lowers the reservation wage and increases work just as it does in classical labour supply theory.
There is a simple diagrammatic representation of this result.  Figure 2a shows a traditional
indifference curve between post-tax income and hours of work.  We have drawn the indifference
curve corresponding to the level of utility obtainable when unemployed.  The reservation wage
will be given by the level of pre-tax income which yields a level of post-tax income to put the
individual on this indifference curve (represented by UU) at hours of work h.  If  the average tax
rate is raised by taking away t  at all income levels then the individual will be on a lower
indifference curve when unemployed, represented by VV.   One way of expressing the statement
that leisure is a normal good is to say that the marginal utility of income falls as we increase hours
of work while moving along an indifference curve.  In diagrammatic terms this means that
indifference curves become further apart as one increases hours of work:  we have drawn the
indifference curves in Figure 2a in this way.  This means that, after the rise in the average tax rate,
the individual will be strictly better-off at the initial reservation income level than they would be
if unemployed.  As the reservation income level is chosen to yield utility equal to that obtainable
when unemployed this means the individual will reduce the reservation income and this means
they are more likely to be in work.
However, one should hesitate before concluding that the predictions of classical labour
supply theory and the search model are identical in this case.   For the classical result, one only
needs the normality of leisure to hold at the point chosen by the individual:   to be able to sign (16)
unambiguously one needs it to hold for all hours below the level worked.  In diagrammatic terms,
normality of leisure at the point chosen means that, at a given level of income, the gap between
indifference curves is increasing in hours.  But, (16) requires the comparison of the marginal
utility of income at two distinct points so requires a comparison of the gap between indifference
curves at these points.  
To see the potential difference, consider a simple case where the utility function can be
written in the form u(y,h)=f (y)-? (h) where f (y) is a strictly concave function.  Leisure is then
normal at all income-hours combinations that might be chosen by a utility-maximising individual
in a classical labour supply model.  But, in a search model whether raising average tax rates
raises the incentives to work depends on whether r is greater than b which depends on whether
? (h) is greater than ? (0).  The conventional assumption is that utility is everywhere decreasing
in hours so that ? (h)>? (0) and [r-t(r)]>[b-tu] which implies a rise in average tax rates increases
the incentive to work.  However there is some, albeit not overwhelming, evidence that, over some
range, utility might be increasing in hours.  For example, some structural search models (e.g
Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985; Narendranathan, 1993) try to estimate the disutility of labour
and find that, controlling for income, work is preferred to unemployment.  Also, evidence from
self-reported satisfaction suggests that, controlling for income, the unemployed are less happy than
those in employment (see, for example, Clark and Oswald, 1994, or Winkelmann and Winkelmann,
1998):  the greater suicide rates among the unemployed might also be construed in a similar way.
All of this is irrelevant in the classical model as, at points that might be chosen by an individual,
leisure is always normal3.  But, in the search model, it is not irrelevant:  if the individual is at a
point where the marginal utility of income is decreasing in hours but where ? (h)<? (0) then an
8d%?u(1&F(r))
d%?e(1&F(r))
. Mr
Mt
< uy(r&t(r),h)&uy(b&tu,0) (18)
d%?u(1&F(r))
d%?e(1&F(r))
. Mr
Mt
> uy(r&t(r),h)&uy(b&t(b),0) (19)
increase in the average tax rate will increase the incentive to work.  This example is illustrated
in Figure 2b where an increase in the average tax rate will reduce the incentives to work.
Next let us consider the case ?u >?e. 
Proposition 2b:  If ?u >?e then:
(i)
(ii) If leisure is everywhere a normal good and uh<0, uy>0 everywhere then an increase in the
average tax rate lowers the reservation wage and increases labour supply.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for the result in part (ii) is very straightforward.  From Proposition 2a we know that
if hours always decrease utility and leisure is a normal good then the marginal utility of income
is lower at the reservation wage than when unemployed even if the level of utility is the same.  But
with ?u >?e  the level of utility at the reservation wage is higher than that when unemployed (see
(13)) which further lowers the marginal utility of income at the reservation wage.
Finally, let us consider the case ?u < ?e. 
Proposition 2c:  If ?e >?u then:
Proof: See Appendix.
There is no second part to this Proposition as it is not so easy to provide plausible sufficient
conditions for when the reservation wage rises or falls with an increase in the average tax rate,
for the following reason.  We know that when ?u < ?e we have u(r-t(r),h)<u(b-tu,0). If we are
prepared to make the assumption that leisure is everywhere a normal good and uh<0 then there are
two effects working in opposite directions.  First there is the effect that if the reservation utility
was equal to the level of utility when unemployed the sign of the right-hand side of (19) will be
negative.  But the fact that the reservation utility is lower raises the marginal utility of income at
the reservation utility level.  The net effect depends on which effect is stronger.  For example, if
the utility function is of the form u(y,h)=f (y)-? (h) then the sign of (Mr/Mt ) depends entirely on
whether [r-t(r)] is larger or smaller than [b-tu].  The greater effectiveness of on-the-job search
tends to make [r-t(r)] smaller than [b-tu], while any disutility of work tends to make it higher, the
net effect depending on which effect is the stronger. 
 One does not need to worry about whether on- or off-the-job search is more effective  if
9sgn Mr
Mt
' sgn uy(r&t(r),h)&uy(b&tu,0) ' sgn ?1(h)&?1(0) (20)
drT
u ' tu % ?um
r
T(x)&T u dF(x) (21)
the agent is risk-neutral so that we can write u(y,h)=y?1(h)+?2(h).  In this case,  changes in the
average tax rate alter neither the marginal tax rate nor the marginal utility of income, so leave
unchanged the part of the expression for the reservation wage which involves the job offer arrival
rates.
Proposition 2d:  If  uyy=0 then:
Proof: Simple substitution in (15)
If  ?1'(h)  has the same sign everywhere then  (Mr/Mt ) has the same sign so that if leisure is
everywhere normal (which, for this utility function, amounts to the assumption that ?1'(h)<0 for all
h) then an increase in the average tax rate will reduce the reservation wage and increase the
probability that an individual is in work.  However  the caution from the discussion of Proposition
2a also applies here:  if utility is increasing in hours over some range then it may be the case that
an increase in average tax rates raises the incentives to work even though leisure may be normal
at the level of hours chosen. 
One way of summarizing the above discussion is that the traditional labour supply effect
which depends on the normality of leisure is still at work when we alter the average tax rate.
Although one has to worry about whether normality holds at hours other than the ones actually
worked.  But there is an additional effect if workers are risk-averse: the direction of which
depends on the sign of (?u -?e) which can be interpreted as the relative effectiveness of on-the-job
and off-the-job search.
4.2 Changes in marginal tax rates
In traditional labour supply analysis one normally considers changes in the marginal tax rate,
holding the average tax rate constant at the chosen income-hours combination so that the individual
is assumed to be able to be as well-off as before if they maintain their behaviour.   It is not
possible to do exactly this exercise in a search model because there is no single income level to
which the individual can be assigned.  Raising the marginal tax rate on wages above the
reservation wage inevitably increases the average tax rate for all higher wages making the
individual worse off even if they behave in the same way as before. 
But there is a notion of a ‘pure’ change in marginal tax rates holding the average tax rate
constant that can be analysed in the search model.  Suppose we consider a change in the tax system
that raises marginal tax rates for all wages above the reservation wage but changes the average
tax rate in such a way that total expected taxes from employment are left unchanged if the
behaviour of the worker is unchanged.
Let us define Tu to be the expected value of taxes from a currently unemployed worker and
T(y) the expected value from a worker currently employed at income y.  By analogy to (8) and (9),
we must have: 
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Differentiating (22) we have that:
Integrating (21) and (22) by parts, using (23) and evaluating (22) at r we then have:
(24) and (25) show that the impact of a change in the tax system on the expected tax take will
inevitably be different for unemployed workers and workers employed at different wages.  It is
natural to alter the marginal tax rate holding constant the expected tax take from an unemployed
worker, Tu , as this ensures that the total expected tax take from a worker entering the labour market
is unchanged.  
A rise in marginal tax rates will raise the final term in (24) which, other things equal, will
raise Tu:  this is because such a rise in marginal tax rates raises the average tax take on workers
paid above the reservation wage.  To keep Tu constant there need to be some off-setting changes
in other parts of the tax system.  By inspection of (24) and (25) this could be a fall in tu or a fall in
t(r).  A fall in tu will transfer resources from employed to unemployed workers:  unsurprisingly one
can show that such a change will always raise the reservation wage and hence reduce labour
supply.  However it does not seem appropriate to describe such a change as a rise in marginal tax
rates holding the average tax rate constant.  So we will consider the other change:  a fall in t(r)
sufficient to keep Tu  constant if behaviour is unchanged.  This change keeps the level of payments
to the unemployed constant so is simply a redistribution of the tax burden among workers employed
at different wages.  The consequence of such a change is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3:  If uyy=0, an increase in the marginal tax rate on wages above the reservation wage
with overall tax revenue from employment unchanged must reduce the reservation wage and
increase incentives to work.
Proof: See Appendix.
Although this result appears to be dramatically at odds with the prediction of classical labour
supply theory, the intuition for the result is very simple.  The change in the tax system increases the
attractiveness of employment at low wages relative to unemployment but reduces the relative
attractiveness of employment at high wages.  But, in deciding on the reservation wage it is the
11
F(y*h) ' 0 for y<wh
F(y*h) ' 1 for y$wh
(26)
attractiveness of employment at low wages that is important and the change means that there is an
incentive to lower reservation wages.  This result, in a different model and expressed in a different
way can be found in Pissarides (1983) and Ljunqvist and Sargent (1995a,b).
Although at first sight this result may look very different to the classical one, some reflection
reveals that it is not so different.  Suppose that we have a canonical model in which all individuals
have the same hourly wage but, because of individual heterogeneity, they choose different income-
hours combinations.  This situation is represented in Figure 3 where, for simplicity, we have
assumed that there are some time and money costs of going to work (as in Cogan, 1981) so that
there is a discontinuity in the budget constraint. In Figure 3 the budget constraint is the vertical line
at zero hours of work and then AA.   Someone with preferences UU will be on the margin of
participation, while someone with preferences VV will not.  Suppose that there is the (realistic)
requirement that all individuals face the same tax schedule.  If the marginal tax rates faced by those
in work is raised but no attempt made for the change to be revenue-neutral then the budget line might
twist from AA to AB.  One can see that the average tax rate will rise for all individuals in
employment.  If the change to the tax system is to be revenue-neutral at unchanged behaviour then
AB must be shifted up, perhaps to CC.  This inevitably induces a negative correlation between the
change in the average tax rate and income; with the average tax rate falling for those with the lowest
incomes.  The individual with preferences UU who was previously at the margin of labour market
participation now strictly prefers to work and some individuals who previously chose not to work
will now want to do so.  Hence, such a change in the tax system can only induce extra participation.
Finally we should briefly consider what happens if workers are risk-averse.  Then an
increase in marginal tax rates also has the benefit, from the point of view of the worker, of
improving the provision of income insurance when employed.  This makes work even more
attractive relative to non-work and strengthens the result of Proposition 3.  
The result in Proposition 3 might appear to make an increase in marginal tax rates costless.
But while this might be the case in the simple model considered here, one needs to be aware of
potentially important adverse effects in richer models.  First high marginal tax rates will act as a
disincentive to higher effort in jobs.  Also, a high marginal tax rate is likely to have an adverse
impact on search intensity as it reduces the reward from higher-wage jobs. 
5. The Impact of the Tax System on Hours of Work
The previous section examined the extreme case where the only variation in job offers was in the
hourly wage and there was no variation in hours.  In this section we analyse the other extreme case
where the only variation in jobs is in the hours offered and all jobs offer the same hourly wage i.e.
the distribution of income conditional on hours is given by:
where w is the hourly wage.  We can now discuss the impact of taxes on both the intensive and
extensive margins of labour supply.  One potentially appealing feature of this model is that it can
nest the classical model of labour supply which assumes (26) and, in addition, that the level of
hours desired by the individual has positive support in j(h) and that the labour market is frictionless
(i.e. ?u=4) so that the individual can immediately get a job at their desired hours level.  All of these
4 This will obviously remain the case even if the distribution of income given hours is not
of the form given in (26).
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u(whl&t(whl)&t ,hl) ' u(whu&t(whu)&t ,hu) ' u(b&tu&t ,0) (27)
are strong assumptions e.g. there is a lot of evidence to suggest that part-time jobs have lower
hourly wages associated with them. 
Now jobs have two dimensions, we need to modify the workers’ decision rule so that they
have a reservation utility level4.  With the assumption in (26) one can represent this as a maximum
hours level they will be prepared to work and a minimum hours level so that only jobs offered
between these two levels will be accepted by the worker.  The desired level of hours given by the
classical labour supply curve must lie within the acceptable range.
As it will turn out that the theoretical predictions are ambiguous we keep matters simple
and assume that ?u=?e so that on-the-job and off-the-job search are equally effective.  In this case
the reservation utility level is simply the level of utility obtainable when unemployed.  Let us
consider the impact of a pure change in average tax rates on hours of work.  Let us assume that the
existing tax system is t(y) and that an amount t  is going to be deducted whatever the level of income.
Let us denote by hl the lowest level of hours the worker will accept and hu the highest level of
hours.  These two levels must satisfy:
If the tax system is continuous and there are no fixed costs of going to work then we will have hl=0
but those are both strong assumptions (one can think of them corresponding to the assumption that
b=0).  We can prove the following result:
Proposition 4:If leisure is everywhere a normal good then hl must be non-increasing in the average
tax rate and hu must be non-decreasing.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward.  The increase in the average tax rate makes the
individual worse off.  When leisure is a normal good this makes them more likely to take jobs
further away from their desired level which means increasing the maximum hours they are prepared
to work and decreasing the minimum hours.  
The impact of the change in the average tax rate on the extensive margin of labour supply
is straightforward.  As the rise in t  raises the maximum acceptable hours and reduces the minimum
acceptable, the fraction of jobs that are acceptable to the worker must rise and, hence, the
probability of being in employment will also rise. 
However, the effect on average hours worked is ambiguous.  If one is interested in the
impact on average hours worked (either conditional on working or unconditional) then one needs
to weight the hours acceptable to the worker by the probability of the worker working those hours.
If the labour market is frictionless then, with probability one, the worker will be employed at their
optimal hours (assuming this is in the support of the offered hours distribution) so it does not make
any sense to look at any other levels of hours.  But, if the labour market is not frictionless then there
will be a distribution of hours which will depend on variables like job arrival rates and job
destruction rates so that one cannot a priori say anything about how measures of average hours will
be affected by changes in average tax rates.
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What about changes in marginal tax rates? 
Proposition 5:An increase in marginal tax rates together with a change in average tax rates to keep
expected tax revenue unchanged at unchanged behaviour will reduce hl and increase hu.
Proof: See Appendix.
It should be obvious from this result that the probability of being in employment rises but that the
impact on measures of average hours will again be ambiguous and subject to the same discussion
as of Proposition 4.
This section has looked at the impact of changes in the tax system on hours worked when
the only source of dispersion in job offers is dispersion in offered hours and the hourly wage is the
same in all offered jobs.  Even in this case the classical results do not carry over unless the market
is frictionless.
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined the impact of changes in the tax system on labour supply in a labour market
where individuals have no flexibility of hours within jobs but must search for ‘good’ jobs.  This
way of thinking about labour supply deserves attention not only because of the proved usefulness
of a search framework in other parts of labour economics but also because the canonical model of
labour supply is based on arbitrary assumptions about the flexibility of hours within jobs.  It is then
important to have some idea of the robustness of traditional comparative statics results.   Some
results from the traditional labour supply literature (e.g. the role of the assumption of the normality
of leisure) have been shown to be useful in a search model but they are rarely the whole story.
Many of the results are quite weak and ambiguous which suggests that economic theory may not be
as much use as a guide to empirical specification as is sometimes assumed.  And some of the
results, notably the impact of a revenue-neutral rise in marginal tax rates, go directly against the
conventional wisdom.
However, this paper is a long way from a complete analysis of the issues raised or a
demonstration of the superiority of the search approach over the classical approach.  In particular,
classical labour supply analysis is largely a practical subject devoted to the empirical analysis of
the impact of tax and welfare systems.  However, the approach described here should not be too
difficult to implement empirically.  An equation like (13) can be made estimable with assumptions
about the distribution of wage offers an individual faces and a knowledge of the tax-benefit system.
Empirical research could either study the durations of spells of non-employment (as the literature
on the impact of welfare systems often has done) or the probability that an individual is in
employment at a particular point in time (as the literature on labour supply normally has done).
There are also a number of theoretical areas where the analysis could be usefully extended.
First, classical labour supply theory finds it difficult to make a meaningful distinction between
inactivity and unemployment and it is hard to relate the definitions of these states used in the
construction of labour market statistics to theoretical concepts.  There has been some empirical
work (Ham, 1982, 1986; Blundell, Ham and Meghir, 1987) on trying to introduce unemployment
in a more realistic fashion but search theory offers a more natural way to do this.  In labour market
statistics those classed as unemployed must be without a job, have looked for work in the recent
past (typically four weeks) and be available to start work within a certain period (normally two
weeks) i.e. it is a definition largely based on the intensity of job search.  Burdett and Mortensen
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(1978), Burdett et al  (1984) and Blundell at al (1998) use this to distinguish between inactivity and
unemployment by using a search model in which search effort is endogenous; and assuming that
those who expend more than a certain amount of  time and/or money in job search are the
unemployed.  We would then expect the tax system to have some impact on search intensity and the
proportions of the workforce who are inactive or unemployed.
Secondly, this paper has concentrated on the impact of the tax system on the outflow rate
from unemployment.  From (14) this is only half of the story about the determinants of the
probability of being in employment:  we also need a model of the impact of the tax system on job
destruction (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, for a model of job destruction in a search
framework).  Such a model would also help the framework used here to address issues about the
dynamics of employment and labour market participation, issues that have been central to much
recent work on traditional labour supply.
So, there is much more research in this area that could and should be done before it can
legitimately pretend to be a viable alternative to more traditional analyses of labour supply.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2a
Using integration by parts, we can write (5) as:
where:
First let us consider the case ?u =?e.  Then we have that:
This gives part (i) for Proposition 2a.  Now consider how we can make progress in signing this.
We know from (13) that, if ?u =?e, u(r-t(r),h)=u(b-tu,0).  Consider the function ? (h) defined by:
for some fixed u0.  Now consider how uy(? (h),h) varies as we change h.  We have that:
where the second equality sign follows from the implicit differentiation of (31).  If the right-hand
side of (32) has the same sign everywhere then this will give the sign of (30).  This yields part (ii)
of Proposition 2a.
Proof of Proposition 2b:
From (28) we have that, in this case:
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[d%?u(1&F(r))]dT(r) ' dt(r) % (?e&?u)dZ < 0 (35)
which gives part (i) of the Proposition.
We know that in this case that u(r-t(r),h)>u(b-tu,0).  If we are prepared to make the assumption that
leisure is everywhere a normal good and uh<0 then we can sign this using the previous result
because we know that if the reservation utility was equal to the level of utility when unemployed
the sign would be negative and the fact that the reservation utility is higher, simply further reduces
the marginal utility of income at the reservation utility level.  This proves part (ii) of the
Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2c:
Using the same approach as in the derivation of (33) we have that:
Proof of Proposition 3
By inspection of (24) and (25) we can see that a rise in marginal tax rates must be accompanied by
a fall in t(r) sufficient to make T(r) fall for Tu  to be unchanged.  Manipulation of (24) and (25)
means that we must have:
where dZ is the change in the term involving the marginal tax rates in (24) and (25), dt(r) is the
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change in the tax burden at the reservation wage and dT(r) is the change in expected tax revenue
from someone employed at the reservation wage.
Now consider the effect of such a change in the tax system on individual’s behaviour.  If
uyy=0 we can write the utility function as u(y,h)=y?1(h)+?2(h).   Using this utility function in the
expression for the reservation wage (13) and differentiating, we have that:
which can be re-arranged to give:
where the inequality follows from (35).  This proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4
By differentiating (27) we have that:
where i=l,u.  From Proposition 2a we know that the sign of the right-hand side of (38) is negative
if leisure is everywhere a normal good and hi>0.  The term in square brackets on the left-hand side
of (38) is positive at hl (as hours must be below the optimal level) and negative at hu as hours must
be above the optimal level.  This proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
If t(b) is left unchanged then from (22) we can see that the effect on hl and hu depends on how t(whl)
and t(whu) change.  By definition:
We know that ty must rise.  If t(whl) rises then tax revenue will rise at all chosen hours so the change
will not be revenue neutral at unchanged behaviour.  So t(whl) must fall which implies that hl must
fall.  Now suppose that t(whu) falls.  Then, from (39) tax revenue must fall at all chosen hours levels
so the change cannot be revenue-neutral.  So t(whu) must rise.  This means that hu will rise (as utility
is decreasing in hours).  This proves the Proposition.
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